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ABSTRACT
This article considers how a major influx of migrants from North Africa and
the Middle East during 2015 led to an EU-initiated collective securitisation of
the Schengen space. The events of 2015 represented an internal crisis for the
EU. This was not simply because migration stretched host country facilities
and created political division within and between the member states. The
uncoordinated reintroduction of border controls by some member states
threatened the unravelling of the Schengen Agreement itself. The consequent
security discourse which then gained currency in EU documents strongly
underlined the need ‘to go back to normality’ and ‘to go back to Schengen’,
not only to manage increasingly tense relations among member states but
also to preserve what was seen as a core achievement of the EU. Contrary to
the expectations of mainstream literature on securitisation, the policies
enacted in response to the securitisation of Schengen have violated neither
‘normal politics’ of the EU nor existing or planned policies on migration and
asylum despite the wide contestation of current EU migration and asylum
practices. The article concludes that the normative dimension behind this
collective securitisation should not be underestimated or too easily discounted.
KEYWORDS Migration; Schengen; securitisation; European Union; security governance
What in 2015–2016 became known as the European ‘refugee’ or ‘migrant
crisis’ (BBC 2016) in fact embodied many discrete, cascading events,
some of which had only a tangential or tenuous connection to the
massive flow of persons en route to the European Union (EU). One
by-product of this trajectory has been the progressive emergence within
the EU of an ‘internal emergency’ that threatened the collapse of the
Schengen Agreement, one of the EU’s greatest achievements and critical
to the realisation of a closer European Union. Ian Traynor claimed
in January 2016 that the ‘Schengen obituaries are being written’, an
impression largely shared and debated by many other actors, member
states, think tanks and policy-makers (Traynor 2016).
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Rather than assessing the securitisation of the general phenomenon –
the refugee crisis and the unprecedented irregular inflows of migrants
into the EU (Lazaridis and Wadia 2015) – this piece gives particular
attention to an important component of that crisis, one that speaks
directly to the EU as such. It focuses, in other words, on the collective
securitisation of the Schengen regime and the ontological threat to the
EU that this process represented.
The Schengen area was created by an agreement in 1985 among five
members of the then European Economic Community (EEC). It was
subsequently embedded in the EU’s institutional architecture and came to
encompass the vast majority of EU member states (with some notable
exceptions such as the United Kingdom) plus non-members Norway,
Iceland, Lichtenstein and Switzerland. The value of Schengen for the
European integration project is self-evident to committed Europeanists:
within the Schengen area there are no internal borders and the free move-
ment of persons (EU citizens in primis) has been elevated to a fundamen-
tal right. The absence of internal border controls has yielded positive
economic externalities (for instance, the absence of administrative delays
at borders) and efficiency gains by enhancing the mobility of labour.
Given its value, the Schengen agreement has acquired the status of a
security referent for its members; it facilitates collective action to meet the
goals of border security (however defined) and is sustained by common
interests, both material (enhanced border control and minimal interfer-
ence with the goals of the single market) and ideational (commonly held
rules and norms contributing to the European integration project).
Migration in 2015 threatened to unravel these various layers and so gave
rise to a securitisation of Schengen as such, with efforts made to provide
‘internal’ order to otherwise uncoordinated patterns of member state
action. As a consequence, the securitisation move had the effect of
highlighting the priority the EU had accorded to EU internal security
over and above the plight of the ‘othered’ migrants.
This argument is unpacked in four sections consistent with the general
model provided by Sperling and Webber (2018). First, the ‘normal’ dis-
course and practice in relation to Schengen prior to 2015 is presented,
complemented by an overview of the parallel security discourse found in
the 2015 Agenda on Migration (European Commission 2015a); this policy
document links the migration phenomenon to the EU’s internal dynam-
ics. The second section provides a description of the multiple and parallel
‘precipitating events’ which led the EU to assume the role of security
principal and to initiate the process of securitising Schengen. The third
section considers the EU’s emergence as an agent of securitisation more
explicitly. The securitising move, and its reception by the member states
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as audience are, in turn, considered as indicative of the recursive inter-
action that facilitates collective securitisation. Section four then describes
the policy response – the EU’s attempt to preserve Schengen and mitigate
the threat posed to the internal cohesion of the Union. In the conclusion,
I return to the peculiarities of this collective securitisation effort, the
security governance logic that has followed from it, and the possible nor-
mative dilemmas posed by the securitisation move and its policy
consequences.
Schengen and security
The establishment and functioning of Schengen in the 1990s inevitably
required that the EU perform as a security actor (Kirchner and Sperling
2007: 163–4) because, according to the European Commission (2018a),
‘the abolition of internal border controls cannot come at the expenses of
security’. The effective removal of internal controls has only been possible
through the tightening of the common external border. This has com-
pelled Schengen frontier states to assume the responsibility for controlling
the EU’s common external border ‘on behalf of the other Schengen states’
(European Commission 2018b). Yet the European Commission (2011: 6)
has realised equally that safeguarding the freedom of movement ought
not to compromise a member state’s ability to deal with serious threats to
public policy or security. Consequently, in order to ensure the acceptance
and functioning of Schengen, provisions were made that allowed member
states the ability, in exceptional circumstances, to reintroduce border
controls when a threat to public policy or internal security arose. But the
temporary suspension of Schengen was subject to two conditions: such
controls would be limited in duration; and other Schengen countries,
the European Parliament and the Commission would receive prior
notification.
If a frontier member state were to exhibit persistent and serious defi-
ciencies in the carrying out of external border control (evaluated through
a set of criteria verifying the application of the Schengen acquis) that ‘put
the overall functioning of the area without internal border control at risk’
and so presented a serious threat to public policy or internal security,
then other member states could reintroduce border controls upon a
proposal of the Commission and a recommendation of the Council so as
to ‘protect the common interests within the area without internal border
control’ (European Parliament and European Council 2006). The option
of suspending Schengen, however, was viewed as a last resort of limited
duration. It was also recognised that, independently of a member state’s
ability to exert effective control of the external border, the crossing of the
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external border by an uncontrollable influx of third-country migrants
could cause ‘unexpected and significant’ secondary movements of irregu-
lar immigrants that may constitute a serious threat for the Union or some
member states. In this circumstance, the reintroduction of internal border
controls, though as a last resort, would be a feasible policy option
(European Commission 2011: 11). Hence, it was understood by the EU
and member states alike that massive and unregulated migration could
produce internal disruptions directly or indirectly via the heightened
possibility of secondary movements in a border-free space.
Before 2015, the recorded violations of the Schengen acquis on controls
at internal borders were negligible. Member states only reintroduced con-
trols on a few occasions and did so in conformity with the legal frame-
work and normative expectations of the Schengen regime (European
Commission 2013). The Commission constantly emphasised the necessity
of coordinating EU policy responses designed to safeguard the right of
free movement, while limiting the possibility of unilateral national initia-
tives that could ‘never be an effective response to common threats’
(European Commission 2011: 3). The Commission also underscored that
the Community method should prevail when devising and coordinating
the exceptional and temporary reintroduction of internal border controls:
Since the free movement of persons within the area without internal
borders is a key Union achievement, the benefits of which are enjoyed by
all the persons living in this area … it should as a general rule require a
decision to be taken at the Union level, rather than for such decision to be
taken unilaterally at the national level. (European Commission 2011: 5)
Hence, the normal functioning of Schengen was understood by the EU
as ‘maintaining the absence of border controls’ (European Commission
2013), thanks both to strengthened measures at the external border and a
set of measures codified at the EU level allowing for the temporary and
coordinated (i.e. among member states and EU institutions) reintroduc-
tion of border controls as a last resort. Both features testified to the EU’s
desire to safeguard the Schengen area, but equally demanded that member
states significantly contribute to this effort, giving substance to
the ‘mutual trust’ at the heart of the Schengen contract (European
Commission 2011). Even in the case of a massive influx of migrants,
Schengen could be maintained through the strict application of its
working provisions. However, such assumptions would prove extremely
fragile when tested against the reality of uncontrolled migration from
war-torn areas of the world.
The EU was fully aware that the number of migrants and asylum
seekers soared between 2015 and 2016 and understood the difficulty of
easily or rapidly managing the influx. In fact, the Agenda on Migration
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(European Commission 2015a), issued in May 2015, contained both
short- and long-term measures to tackle the massive inflows of migrants
and asylum seekers into Europe and to set the basis for a more far-
sighted handling of the issue (Ceccorulli and Lucarelli 2018). Concurrent
with short-term initiatives taken to help manage the immediate concern
with controlling migrant inflows, the EU considered other medium- and
long-term measures that would help avoid similar disruptions in the
future. The policy goals here were to prevent uncontrolled migration at
its source and to enhance the EU’s ability to cope with it. But the
Union’s (and member states’) primary focus on the ‘external’ challenge
represented by the arrival of massive numbers of asylum seekers (tellingly
mis-specified as a ‘refugee crisis’) had the effect of deflecting the real cri-
sis: an imminent ‘internal’ emergency that would soon impact the viability
of the Schengen system itself. The progressive acknowledgement of this
emerging challenge was revealed in the multi-phased implementation
packages of the Agenda on Migration, which expressed a significant
change in the EU’s perception of security in this regard. But what exactly
were the components of this policy shift and redefinition of security?
Precipitating event(s): not one, not mainly external, not a shock
EU measures to mitigate the refugee crisis mirrored two security
discourses set forth in the Agenda on Migration with respect to migration
management: preventing the loss of migrants’ lives and securing EU
borders (see also European Commission 2015b). Gradually, the concern
with the latter took precedence. This shift was evident in member
state disregard of some of the recommended measures contained in two
implementation packages and by events that unfolded in parallel with
those measures.
In May 2015, the Union issued the first ‘implementation package’ of
the Agenda on Migration aimed at relieving the migratory pressures on
frontline states. At that point, attention was mainly directed at enforcing
a relocation plan among member states and at preventing migrant deaths
at sea. In response to Italian and Greek entreaties, the European
Commission proposed, on the basis of Article 78(3) TFEU (never yet trig-
gered), a temporary relocation scheme among the member states. That
programme was geared toward alleviating pressure on reception capabil-
ities in Greece and Italy and avoiding uncontrolled secondary movements
to interior states (European Commission 2015c). The emphasis, hence,
was on showing solidarity with states at the frontier; the Council was
urged to approve the Decision and member states to implement it. The
Commission committed itself to support Italy and Greece operationally
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and financially and requested that both member states improve their own
asylum systems and repatriation capacities. The Commission reasoned
that since the migration and asylum crisis constituted a common chal-
lenge, the EU had to collectively provide a way out of the emergency
(European Commission 2015c: 8). A total of 40,000 migrants (24,000 in
Italy and 16,000 in Greece), classified as persons ‘in clear need of inter-
national protection’, were to be relocated in other member states. In
September 2015, the Council adopted the European Commission Decision
(European Council 2015a) outlining provisional measures supporting Italy
and Greece amid member state haggling over the number of persons to
be relocated and the parameters for redistributing them equitably.
Prior to that Decision, however, two developments complicated EU
action: first, the inflow of migrants increased over the summer of 2015;
and second, the migratory pattern shifted and added Hungary as a new
key transit route into the Schengen area. The eastern Mediterranean route
rapidly became a favoured entry point, especially for Syrians. Relatedly, a
significant portion of irregular entries into the EU occurred via the west-
ern Balkans. In response, the EU issued a ‘Second Implementation
Package’ in September 2015. Relocation still figured prominently as a col-
lective response, and the redistribution scheme was extended to Hungary.
Migrants used Hungary primarily as a transit point to enter either Austria
or Germany. As in the case of Italy and Greece, overwhelming flows
coupled with deficiencies in Hungarian reception capacities facilitated
secondary movements to other member states. A total of 120,000 persons
in clear need of international protection (15,600 in Italy, 50,400 in Greece
and 54,000 in Hungary) were to be relocated. The European Commission
ensured direct support to the three states and committed to close over-
sight of member states’ (mandatory) implementation of the scheme. The
second relocation scheme Decision was approved on 23 September 2015,
although Hungary, one of the presumed beneficiaries of that Decision,
never committed to implementing the plan.
The perceived ‘security’ situation, then, was progressively changing. To
the policy rhetoric emphasising the ‘external’ challenge posed by the mas-
sive influx of migrants, the EU added another layer of rhetoric that
underscored the emergent internal challenge to the Schengen regime. The
key manifestations of this internal challenge included the perception that
Greece was incapable of controlling its external border and managing
massive inflows of migrants and asylum seekers as well as the decision of
some member states, partly as a reaction to the Greek failure, to reintro-
duce temporary internal border controls. The Second Implementation
Package thus scaled down the ‘saving of lives’ discourse and encouraged a
narrative dedicated to the preservation of Schengen.
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Uncontrolled migratory inflows indeed tested the EU (European
Commission 2015d), revealing an unwillingness among the member states
to coordinate actions. Relocation proceeded (if at all) at a very slow pace.
The Commission, concerned at this state of affairs, pointed out that
legislative (Regulations and Directives), financial (funding programmes
under migration and internal security, but also funds relocated from other
areas), and operational (European Asylum Support Office [EASO], the
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders [FRONTEX], the European Union Agency for Law
Enforcement Cooperation [EUROPOL]) and crisis management mecha-
nisms (Rapid Border Investigation Teams, Civil Protection Mechanism)
were already at the member states’ disposal to meet the exceptional chal-
lenge. The Commission charitably concluded that member state noncon-
formity with EU rules reflected an underappreciation of the range of
policy instruments that were available (European Commission 2015d: 6).
But despite the Commission’s repeated attempts to promote a coordinated
response (even threatening the possibility of sanctioning measures such as
infringements procedures), the member states increasingly opted for
the temporary introduction of national border controls so as to avoid
secondary movements from frontier states.
Accordingly, the ‘normalization of the Schengen area and the lifting of
temporary internal border controls’ started to become the Commission’s
key priority (European Commission 2015d: 7). Ever more attention was
paid to Greece’s inability to control its external border, a failure consid-
ered to be a major contributing factor to the rising pressure on the
European asylum system. The Commission pointedly noted that ‘it is a
strong external border which allows us to free up our internal borders
through the Schengen area, and to guarantee free movement of people’
(European Commission 2015d: 13). Dublin Regulation transfers to Greece
had been suspended since 2011 given the deficiencies in the Greek asylum
system, while a soaring number of migrants intentionally entered the
country in order to reach other preferred European destinations. Hence,
Greece had to improve swiftly the robustness of its overall asylum system
and thereby eliminate one of the most important incentives for secondary
movement to other EU countries. The need to strengthen the external
border at its weakest point also compelled consideration that a European
Border and Coast Guard was necessary. Bringing back ‘order’ in migra-
tion management started to become a catchword, as did the so-called
‘hotspot approach’ for the identification, fingerprinting and registration of
migrants upon arrival. The European Union intent in supporting this new
approach was evident through the actions of relevant EU agencies
(FRONTEX, EASO, EUROPOL and the European Union Judicial
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Cooperation Unit [EUROJUST]). Through such systems, relocation could
be accelerated, the Dublin Regulation properly implemented, and the
return of irregular migrants facilitated.
The rapidly worsening situation in the following months was reflected
in the Commission’s documents urging member states to implement fully
and immediately already agreed upon provisions (European Commission
2015e). Since the proper management of the eastern Mediterranean route
proved increasingly crucial to staunching the inflow of migrants, the EU
invited Western Balkan states to agree upon a coordinated approach
(European Commission 2015i). Coordination with Turkey was also
envisaged and an EU‒ Turkey Action Plan was signed on 15 October
2015 (European Commission 2015f), followed by a Joint Statement in
March 2016. The Commission, meanwhile, was finalising an opinion on
the prolongation of temporary Austrian, German and Slovenian border
controls. That action acknowledged the increasing ‘internal’ salience that
the migration issue was acquiring. The November 2015 terrorist attacks
in Paris only strengthened the emphasis on securing both external and
internal borders.
When the Commission put forward the Third Implementation Package
(or ‘Border Package’) in December 2015, it stated that the proposed meas-
ures would ‘manage the EU’s external borders and protect our Schengen
area without internal borders’ (European Commission 2015g). The road
towards the collective securitisation of Schengen had been opened. The
key provision of this package was the creation of the European Border
and Coast Guard. In response to the ‘exceptionally high’ winter migratory
inflows into the EU, especially into Greece, it became much more urgent
that the EU and the member states accelerate the implementation of the
hotspot system and the relocation scheme so as to alleviate the burden on
frontier states, facilitate the return of irregular migrants, and improve
national reception capacities (European Commission 2015h). Meanwhile,
many member states, particularly Hungary, expressed discontent with
Greece and identified it as the weakest link of the Schengen chain (Zalan
2015). The EU, in an effort to diffuse this mounting resentment, provided
operational and financial support to help Greece manage the crisis, almost
to the point of guiding and controlling the situation on the ground
(European Commission 2015h). At the same time, given the huge increase
in asylum applications, Sweden requested and obtained a derogation on
its obligations under the relocation scheme (as did Austria in February
2016). By December 2015, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Sweden
and non-EU Norway had reintroduced temporary controls at internal
borders. France had already done the same in response to the terrorist
attacks of November 2015.
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In the context of an ever disordered internal border security regime,
multiple proposals arose on the future of Schengen (including one for a
‘Mini-Schengen’). Public debate, meanwhile, articulated a notion of an
EU in ‘internal crisis’ and, in parallel, questioned the very existence of the
Schengen area (Brunsden et al. 2016; Guild et al. 2015; Peers 2015;
Traynor 2016). Opinion polls showed member states and their citizens
increasingly anxious and inclined toward the renationalisation of border
controls (Diamanti 2016). At the beginning of 2016, tensions between
Austria and Greece rose to such a pitch that the Commissioner for
Migration bluntly warned that the system might ‘break down’ should
such divisions spread to other countries or become more acute (Barigazzi
2016). The Austrian Minister for the Interior suggested it was necessary
to move the Schengen frontier to central Europe since Greece was unable
to ‘secure’ the Greek-Turkish border (Nielsen and Zalan 2016). Austria
convened a mini-summit of the Balkan states in late February 2016, to
which the Greeks were not invited. That summit produced the Vienna
Declaration ‘Managing Migration Together’. Preoccupied with limiting
migratory flows through the Western Balkans route, it called on Schengen
frontier states (i.e. Greece) to fulfil their obligations.
This downward spiral of increasingly strained relations threatened the
survival of the Schengen area and led ultimately to the collective securi-
tisation of Schengen. That securitisation, in turn, offers two important
points for theoretical reflection, which support some arguments advanced
in the introductory chapter of this special issue. First, migration in 2015
was a cumulative crisis – a cascading of events which challenged the
security of the EU. Second, the problem, while externally generated
(the upsurge in migration was an exogenous shock), had consequences
for the endogenous character of the EU as a security provider.
The securitisation of Schengen does not provide an easy fit with the
dichotomous categories of politicisation and securitisation; in this regard,
it supports the thesis that ‘politics does not evaporate at the doorstep of
securitization’ (Balzacq 2015). Rather, security is in a continuous and
performative dialogue with politics, affecting and being affected by it. In
the case under consideration, securitisation came as a process of overlap-
ping rather than distinct, separate steps (Sperling and Webber 2018),
while the tipping point can be traced to the member states’ challenge to
the passport-free zone. One may be tempted to give priority to one event
over another, but to do so would risk marginalising or discounting
equally important events. Likewise, the precipitating event may be consid-
ered the massive and sudden inflow of migrants, but this inflow, per se,
did not push the Commission to securitise Schengen. The reintroduction
of national border controls within the Schengen area was the single most
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threatening move against the preservation of the Schengen regime. The
member states consciously chose the uncoordinated reintroduction of
national border controls as the policy response rather than a common
policy to alleviate the burden on the most affected states at the common
EU frontier. And this conscious choice brought about the ‘internal crisis’
threatening the functioning and survival of the Schengen system. The res-
toration of the order and predictability afforded by the Schengen regime
became the EU’s utmost priority. Towards preventing a mass defection
from Schengen, the Commission reminded the member states that ‘the
Schengen system contains a great deal of flexibility to allow member
states to respond to evolving circumstance’ (European Commission 2016a:
13). Keeping faith with the requirements of Schengen was essential if the
EU were to avoid the costs attending its collapse.
Schengen in crisis: the process of recursive interaction
The member states’ reluctance to abide by their commitments, the struc-
tural weaknesses in the border control and asylum systems of frontier
states, multiple voices anticipating the death of Schengen and, above all,
the uncoordinated reintroductions of national border controls within the
EU opened the way for a securitisation move. And this move was much
more than simply a mediation effort by the EU: it underscored the critic-
ality of preserving Schengen and safeguarding the ontological security of
the EU itself. As such, securitisation sought to unwind the unilateral
imposition of national border controls and, relatedly, to restore order and
predictability in view of the member states’ uncoordinated actions. We
can identify the relevant phases of the securitisation move and explore
the constitutive moments of recursive interaction, whereby the authorita-
tive security actor (those speaking on behalf of the EU, with the
Commission and the Council taking the lead) interacts with the relevant
empowering audience (the member states) to securitise a threat and agree
upon necessary mitigating actions.
In an attempt to investigate the ‘lesson learned’ from the temporary
reintroduction of controls at internal borders, the Luxembourg Council
Presidency in late 2015 asked the member states to respond to a question-
naire. The results of that exercise underlined that many of the reintro-
duced internal border controls had occurred without prior notice, thereby
negatively affecting bordering states’ ability to adjust. At the same time,
though, emphasis was placed on the potential challenges created by sec-
ondary movements, especially on asylum capabilities (European Council
2015b). Slovenia’s Prime Minister Miro Cerar, for one, warned that if
stricter controls were adopted by Germany and Austria, Slovenia could
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not but adopt the same policy; he explained that, notwithstanding his
support for Schengen, he was responsible for ensuring the security of his
own country from unwanted migration (Nielsen 2016). The Austrian
Chancellor Werner Faymann similarly affirmed that the inability of the
frontier member states to secure external borders both threatened the
integrity of Schengen and compelled national leaders to reintroduce con-
trols at their own national borders so as to preserve domestic tranquillity
(Corriere della Sera 2016). The Presidency made clear, however, that there
ought to be no allowance for the unilateral imposition of controls on
internal borders for more than six months. It did acknowledge that the
Schengen Border Code allowed, upon a proposal of the Commission, an
extension of border controls for up to two years in response to cases of
persistent border control deficiencies in frontier member states (European
Council 2015b). The EU was nonetheless sending a message both to
Greece (urging the full implementation of the EU’s guidelines) and to the
member states that unilateral action was impermissible.
In this context of persistent and uncontrollable migratory inflows and
reinstituted national border controls, the EU’s main institutional
actors (the Council, the Commission and the Parliament) undertook a
securitisation of Schengen. The Council Conclusions of 18–19 February
2016 stated:
[i]n response to the migration crisis facing the EU, the objective must be to
rapidly stem the flows, protect our external borders, reduce illegal
migration and safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area. It is important
to restore, in a concerted manner, the normal functioning of the Schengen
area, with full support for member states which face difficult circumstances.
(European Council 2016)
In that spirit, the European Council President Donald Tusk warned that
‘[s]aving Schengen is a race against time’ (Holehouse 2015).
But it was the Commission that identified most emphatically the threat
to Schengen and the broader implications for the Union. Its
Communication of March 2016, tellingly titled ‘Back to Schengen – A
Roadmap’, positioned Schengen as ‘one of the major achievements of
European integration … one of the key means through which European
citizens can exercise their freedoms, and the internal market can prosper
and develop’ (European Commission 2016b: 2). The spiral of events
leading to the temporary reintroduction of borders by some member
states had, the Communication continued, placed in question ‘the proper
functioning of the Schengen area of free movement’; its demise ‘would
risk destroying one of the central achievements of European integration
and the construction of a shared European space’ (European Commission
2016b: 2, 4). The Commission characterised the threat to Schengen as an
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internal crisis that exposed the shortcomings of the integration process in
the migration and asylum domain. The desire to save Schengen thus
required the EU to reconcile the reintroduction of internal border con-
trols with existing legal frameworks governing Schengen. The
Commission claimed that the Union had ‘a clear roadmap to return to a
normal functioning of the Schengen zone by November and we need to
get there in an orderly way. We preserve Schengen by applying Schengen’
(European Commission 2016b). This reconciliation process could only
come into being after the Commission had ‘formally’ recognised the risk
to the integrity of the Schengen space. In fact, it was only upon the
Commission’s recommendation that the Council could eventually trigger
the safeguard procedure of Article 29 of the Schengen Border Code.
The costs of, and implications for, the demise of Schengen were also
made clear in studies of the European Parliament. Internal border con-
trols, these argued, could disrupt the operation of the Single Market and
‘endanger the future benefits of … EU integration’ (European Parliament
2016a: 1; see also European Parliament 2016b, 2016c). This was a view
echoed even by those states that had themselves reintroduced border
controls; such measures being regarded as inevitable rather than as
intrinsically desirable. Hungary, especially critical of the EU’s handling of
the refugee crisis, nonetheless urged Brussels ‘to preserve the passport free
area at all costs’ (Kahn 2016), a position echoed in the sentiments of lead-
ers in Poland and other east European member states (Potyrała 2016).
Summing up, the securitisation of Schengen was the climax of a series
of developments both internal and external to the EU. The stakes were
particularly high for the EU, and this is why the process went far beyond
the mediation of member state positions: the survival of Schengen was
given priority over any other issue and that became a key aim of the EU’s
agenda, shared by the Commission, the Council and the Parliament and
accepted by the most relevant empowering audience, the member states.
In this security discourse, the ‘saving the lives’ objective was clearly side-
lined by that of the ‘security of borders’.
Normalising the Schengen area: EU security governance
The collective securitisation of the Schengen area had significant implica-
tions for the European system of security governance as well as for the
interaction density among the member states. A first observation here is
that the securitisation move did not produce emergency responses that
violated the Union method of internal governance. On the contrary, the
initial securitisation reflected the EU’s role as system regulator and an
attempt to reconcile the uncoordinated moves of the member states with
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established EU crisis management tools, especially the Schengen Borders
Code. Also, most of the measures taken to minimise the threat to
Schengen were in the legislative pipeline before the ‘internal’ crisis
erupted. If anything, the securitisation of Schengen enabled the EU to
gain the upper hand vis-a-vis the member states and so enforce the accel-
erated implementation of planned measures. Second, the securitisation
process reconciled short-term objectives (to keep Schengen alive and
mitigate the immediate security concerns of the member states) with
long-term objectives (reducing the overall number of migrants en route
to the EU and strengthening measures of crisis management), hence
reinforcing the EU’s security actorness in this policy domain.
The security governance provisions to bring Schengen to normality can
be found in the Commission’s ‘Back to Schengen’ document (subse-
quently endorsed in a Statement by EU Heads of State and Government
on 7 March 2016). Both documents attempted to define appropriate
behaviour for member states (regulatory interaction, in other words) and
to leverage member state security needs into institutionalised behaviour
(patterned interaction). ‘Back to Schengen’ gave priority to three sets of
demands. First, the lack of control by Greece over its external border had
to be addressed; the country had to become compliant with Schengen
requirements and the EU’s asylum legislation more generally. Second,
member states had to end the ‘wave-through’ approach by fully
implementing existing EU law and recent decisions on asylum. And third,
a coordinated framework was required in order to lend coherence to
the ‘patchwork of unilateral decisions’ on internal borders taken by
eight countries in the Schengen area (European Commission 2016b).
Concurrently, the Parliament and Council were asked to swiftly adopt the
Regulation establishing the European Border and Coast Guard proposal
in conjunction with efforts to significantly reduce irregular inflows
towards the EU in partnership with Turkey. Aside from ensuring
coordinated member state actions with respect to internal border controls,
none of the other measures proposed was new or violated ‘normal’ policy
processes within the EU.
The introduction of temporary border controls by some member states
was, in fact, the single most apparent threat to the Schengen system.
Member state responses to the influx of migrants spanned a range of
national securitisation moves taken in an uncoordinated fashion and
without regard to their impact on other member states (European
Commission 2016c). The EU’s action in response was geared not to
eliminating border checks but rendering them compatible with the EU’s
normative-legal framework. The Commission acknowledged the inability
of Greece to control the common external border and that unregistered
314 M. CECCORULLI
migrants stranded in Greece could move irregularly to other member
states. Consequently, in May 2016 it recommended the activation of
Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code (European Commission
2016c: 7). The Council followed up shortly after with an implementing
decision. The proposal was intended to mitigate ‘serious threats to public
policy or internal security within the Schengen area’ and ‘to address the
threat putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal
border controls’ (European Commission 2016c: 8). The recommendation
did not exclude Greece from Schengen, as some member states had
proposed, but ‘allowed and institutionalised’ the prolongation of existing
controls at internal borders (of Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden
and Norway).
Aside from this specific provision, the measures proposed in the Back
to Schengen Roadmap had already been advanced in the 2015 Agenda on
Migration, and hence before the ‘internal crisis’ erupted. Greece had been
under close scrutiny by the EU since inflows started to shift towards the
eastern Mediterranean route. Other measures advanced in the Roadmap,
such as the effective implementation of the hotspot system, new guidance
for fingerprint collection into the European Dactyloscopie (EURODAC)
(extended also to irregular migrants on top of asylum seekers), the pro-
posal to shift existent Directives on asylum into Regulations and
enhanced coordination with the Western Balkan states were already
planned or primed for implementation. This package of measures was
seen as a means of compensating for the ‘wave-through’ approach of
some member states and of reducing secondary movements of migrants
that threatened to create intolerable imbalances among member states.
Ultimately, the positive effects of reduced secondary movements would
pave the way for the effective implementation of orderly relocation and
resettlements plans. Efforts to adapt existing systems (such as the Dublin
Regulation allocating responsibility for the examination of asylum
requests) for prospective migration crises gained momentum, but as these
were already in gestation they cannot be seen as a direct product of the
securitisation move (European Commission 2016d).
But the securitisation move did have an accelerating effect on pending
measures. Repeated failures to create the European Border and Coast
Guard (in 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2014) were finally overcome. EU dialogue
with Turkey was also taken forward. A Visa Liberalisation Dialogue with
Turkey had been launched in 2013 leading to discussions on the possibil-
ity of visa-free short-stay entries in the EU for Turkish citizens; an EU‒
Turkey readmission agreement then entered into force in 2014. Together
with the Joint Action Plan signed in October 2015, this measure provided
the EU with a voice on Turkey’s migration policy, with a view to
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stemming irregular immigration through the readmission of third country
nationals (European Commission 2016e). A Greek‒Turkish readmission
protocol, in force since 2001, was also significantly strengthened, as was
cooperation in the last months of 2015, thanks in part to the NATO naval
deployment in the Aegean Sea. These moves culminated in the 18 March
Statement between the EU and Turkey. The deal (practically sealing the
EU’s eastern border) was harsher than previous cooperation provisions
with Turkey. In the Communication that preceded the Statement, the
Commission underlined that ‘whilst some important steps are still needed,
the means, both legal and practical, exist to initiate the new arrangements
as a matter of urgency’ (European Commission 2016f).
The overlap of measures to save Schengen with those directed at cop-
ing with the ‘refugee crisis’ (producing a sort of continuity in the system
of security governance) leads to a second observation. The main rationale
behind this augmented system of border governance was that massive
inflows were likely to create insecurity within and possible tensions
among member states. If such tensions constituted a challenge to the EU
as such, then preventing arrivals on the EU’s territory seemed the most
reasonable solution to forestall such an outcome. The European Border
and Coast Guard has been generally interpreted as a qualitative improve-
ment of the EU agency FRONTEX for the control of the external border
and the prevention of future crises. In this vein, the agreement with
Turkey should be viewed as a possible model for strengthening relations
with third countries.1
Conclusion
The massive and uncontrolled number of migrants and asylum seekers
arriving in Europe between 2015 and 2016 is commonly referred to as the
EU ‘refugee crisis’. This inflow constituted a concomitant ‘internal crisis’
that posed a threat to EU’s ontological security: that is, a threat ‘to the
very basis of the [EU’s] collective self’ (Ceccorulli and Lucarelli 2018).
The collective securitisation of Schengen has been the product of such an
acknowledgment. The security threat ‒ and response ‒ took the form of
a collective effort by the EU to meet an existential challenge to a core
achievement of the EU. The internal debate within the EU and the policy
responses flowing from it reveal that that the underlying policy preoccu-
pation was preserving the Schengen regime. The securitisation of
Schengen answered an internal, rather than an external crisis. The EU
had as its declared objectives the restoration of the normal functioning of
Schengen – indeed, the preservation of the Schengen area as such. Hence,
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the securitisation of Schengen stands as a particularly ‘political’ act in the
choice of securitisation (Waever 2015).
This process of collective securitisation was not an answer to a single
event; rather, the analysis has shown that it was a product of both
sequential and parallel interactions, ranging from the Greek inability to
control the external border to the temporary reintroduction of internal
border controls by some member states. This latter move, in particular,
demonstrated the magnitude of the internal crisis; the uncoordinated
imposition of internal border controls posed the clearest existential threat
to the Schengen area. In addition, the triggering events were not or not
only ‘external’ to the EU, but largely internal in origin: ‘wave-through’
practices, implementation failures and unilateral moves. The securitisation
of Schengen retained an emphasis on securing borders, but more as a
means of ensuring good EU governance ‒ the necessity of actions to ‘save
lives’ was subsequently marginalised.
Yet the securitisation move did not ignite a radically ‘new’ form of
security governance. Alongside realigning member states’ unilateral moves
to the normative and legal framework embedded in the Schengen Borders
Code, the Roadmap proposed to re-establish Schengen via the full
implementation of already agreed-upon policies. Nonetheless, in some
cases the securitisation of Schengen did allow the EU to fast track provi-
sions, evident in initiatives taken with Turkey and the rolling out of the
European Border and Coast Guard. In this sense, measures intended to
preserve the Schengen area coincided with both short-term responses to
the refugee crisis as well as to longer-term strategy for handling migration
in years to come. Combined, this meant security achieved a new promin-
ence in the EU’s approach to the handling of migration and asylum.
Finally, the normative dimension of the securitisation move cannot be
overlooked (see also Floyd 2018). The normative issue is all the more per-
tinent given that the collective effort by the EU went far beyond media-
ting the member states’ divergent positions. Overall, the theoretical toolkit
on the ethics of migration provide contrasting positions on how the EU’s
actions should be judged (Gibney 2004; Macdonald 2015). For all their
ethical force, ‘partialism’ (giving priority to the claims of the internal
community) and ‘impartialism’ (weighing impartially the claims of the
members of the community and of outsiders) could not be easily recon-
ciled in this case. If, as suggested by Gibney (2004), both particular and
universal claims have to be taken into account for a normative approach
to be politically relevant, how might this translate into a purposefully nor-
mative policy response when the actor under scrutiny is the EU?
Representing a core value for the EU and one of the key
accomplishments of its integration process, the securitisation and then the
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normalisation of Schengen may be interpreted in itself as a morally
legitimate move, underscoring the collective responsibility of the EU as a
security actor. However, the EU in formulating a policy response has had
to take into account three competing claims: those of its member states
(one version of partialism); those relating to universal human rights
(impartialism); and those that relate to the EU’s existence as an authorita-
tive security actor principally expressed in the integrity of the Schengen
space (a second version of partialism). Put slightly differently, any
evaluation of the ethical dimension of collective securitisation must take
into account the closeness of fit between the preservation of security
governance and the broader normative claims of the relevant security
actor (the EU in this case). The securitisation of the Schengen space can
be tentatively assessed as a move with ethical power in itself. Yet its
consequences, in terms of governance, resulted in the prioritisation of the
security of internal space over the claims of migrants and asylum seekers.
That choice raises the equally compelling question: can the EU act as a
normative power when its ontological security is under threat? This case
suggests that it cannot.
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Note
1. This kind of policy initiative is central to the Agenda on Migration and the
new EU Global Strategy, both of which emphasise the role of the ‘external
dimension’ to migration (European Commission 2016g).
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